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PANCHO VILLA AND THE COLUMBUS RAID:
THE MISSING DOCUMENTS

CHARLES H. HARRIS III AND LOUIS R. SADLER

GENERAL PANCHO VILLA'S attack on the small New Mexico
border town of Columbus during the predawn hours of March 9,
1916, holds a particular fascination for historians of the Mexican
Revolution. These writers, both Mexican and American, have continued to dispute not only the details of Villa's raid, but, more importantly, its significance. Yet none of the numerous books and
articles dealing with the raid has definitively answered the central
question: Why did Villa raid Columbus? It is precisely because
Villa's motivation for the raid remains unclear that historians have
avidly sought additional documentation to lay this point to rest
once and for all. The existence, therefore, of a mass of documents
found in the saddlebags of a dead Villista officer at Columbus has
tantalized scholars for more than half a century. These long-lost
documents have now been found in the National Archives.! Although the papers do not reveal why Villa attacked Columbus, the
finding of the documents solves one of the major historiographical
mysteries of the Mexican Revolution and provides a sizable body
of primary material for a phase of Villa's career which has not been
fully studied.
The general outline of Villa's assault on Columbus is too well
known to be repeated here. What is less evident are the circumstances surrounding the finding of the Villa papers and their subsequent transmission to officials in the War Department. The documents were discovered shortly after Villa's troops retreated from
Columbus and soldiers of the United States 13th Cavalry began
policing up the debris of battle. After the saddlebags were un-

336

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW L: 4 1975

covered near the body of a dead Villista officer, they were
examined by army officers, who delivered them to a State Department representative. This official, George C. Carothers, who arrived in Columbus within hours of the raid, pronounced them
genuine. In a letter to General Hugh Lennox Scott, Carothers
wrote: "I was in Columbus the afternoon of the day the attack
took place, and examined the papers that were in the two wallets
Villa lost on the battlefield during his retreat. The papers fully
connect him with the Santa Isabel massacre, and also establish the
fact that he decided to declare war on us last December."2 And in
subsequent testimony Carothers stated: "I also examined two large
portfolios of documents that were found, that I recognized as being
those of a secretary of Villa, and they contained a great many documents of different kinds . . . which were afterwards forwarded
to Washington."s The two wallets of papers were hand carried from
Columbus to Fort Bliss, and then shipped to Southern Department
Headquarters at Fort Sam Houston. There the department commander, Major General Frederick Funston, studied the documents
before sending them to the adjutant general in Washington. 4
A New York Times correspondent gained access to the documents, and brief excerpts from two of them were published in the
March I I, 19 I 6, edition of that newspaper. But historians have
heretofore never succeeded in examining the captured Villa papers.
As Clarence C. Clendenen noted in his prize winning book, The
United States and Pancho Villa, "the writer has seen several
references to these lost papers but has been unable to locate them."5
The authors of the most recent scholarly articles on the Columbus
raid, Francis J. Munch6 and James A. Sandos, both refer to the
missing Villa papers. Sandos states: "Numerous students have attempted to locate these papers but without success. This writer,
following Arthur S. Link, Haldeen Braddy, and Clarence Clendenen, also tried to find the elusive manuscripts, but to no avail.
These documents did exist, however."T Perhaps the most extreme
position taken regarding the Villa papers was that of the folklorist Haldeen Braddy, who, in a monograph on the Columbus
raid, referred to a long and careful search made by a local historian
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at Columbus who failed to locate the papers. On the basis of this,
Braddy concluded that the manuscripts never existed. 8
They do indeed exist and were located in January 1975 in the
National Archives in Washington. For several years we have been
engaged in research on one of the most important but most neglected aspects of the Mexican Revolution-how the various factions armed themselves. Since it was armed might, as well as
ideology, that shaped the Revolution, a study of the munitions
industry within a broad context will provide the basis for a significant reinterpretation of the revolutionary movement itself.
It was while conducting this research that the missing Villa
papers were uncovered. Our interest in the Columbus raid centered only on its relation to our larger project. We had, therefore,
kept the missing documents in mind in the hope that they might
contain material bearing on Villa's acquisition of munitions. While
working in the National Archives we talked at length with Timothy Nenninger, a senior archivist in the Old Army and Navy
Branch. In response to our inquiry concerning the missing manuscripts, Nenninger suggested that there were several possibilities.
His search produced a portfolio from the Records of the Adjutant
General's Office, which indeed contained the Villa papers. In
short, the principal credit for bringing the long-lost documents to
light belongs to Nenninger, to whom we are deeply indebted. In
all probability, the documents were overlooked by previous researchers because of the method used for indexing the files. There
are record cards for each set of documents, but in the case of the
Villa papers several cards are clipped together, and the initial one
does not fully indicate the file's contents.
Some of the documents are of little value, such as fifty-two unsigned commissions, mainly for company grade officers, dated on
September 14, 1915, at Villa's headquarters in Torreon. The commissions were evidently intended to have been signed by Villa.
There are also a few telegrams in which Villa is asked to resolve
personal problems among his followers. 9 Of greater interest is a
telegram from the manager of the American Smelting and Refining Company's installation at Chihuahua, protesting to Villa the
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state government's decree confiscating the company's property and
proposing an arrangement whereby operations could continue. 111
The bulk of the documents deal with Villa's disastrous campaign
in Sonora, launched from Chihuahua in October 1915 in a desperate effort to offset the crushing defeats that General Alvaro
Obreg6n had inflicted on him in the spring of that year. Villa
planned the Sonora campaign assuming that the United States
would remain neutral in the struggle; but on October 19, 1915,
Wilson recognized Venustiano Carranza as de facto President of
Mexico, and the result was catastrophic for Villa. Not only was the
. border closed to arms shipments for him, but also Washington
permitted Carranza to reinforce Sonora with thousands of General
Obreg6n's troops transported on American railroad lines from Eagle
Pass, Texas.
That Villa regarded Washington's action as a betrayal is well
known, but his antipathy toward the United States extended down
to the Mormons, among the most inoffensive Americans then
living in Mexico. On October 26, 1915, only a week after the
recognition of Carranza, Villa assembled the inhabitants of Colonia
Morelos, in northeastern Sonora near the Chihuahua border, and
delivered a fiery speech. The general stated his intention of rescuing the settlers from the "tyranny of the North American
Mormons, who exploit, vilify, and assassinate the Mexicans in
this region." He urged his listeners to "throw off the yoke of the
Yankee," offering to arm them; they in turn promised forcibly to
prevent any Mormons from settling in the area. l l Villa's taking
time at the beginning of a crucial military campaign to whip up
anti-Mormon sentiment would indicate that, despite his public
pronouncements, his growing hatred of Americans was by no
means limited to those in the Wilson administration.
Regarding the conduct of the Sonoran campaign itself, the
documents include a series of telegrams to Villa from Carlos E.
Randall, whom the former had appointed as interim governor of
Sonora. 12 These communications, sent from Nogales while that
city still functioned as the Villista capital of the state, are routine,
with the exception of one telegram announcing the fall of Naco
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and one written largely in cipher, for which there is no clear text. IS
There is, in addition, a scattering of telegrams to Villa from his
field commanders, Generals Fructuoso Mendez,14 Francisco Beltran/ 5 Jose Maria Jurad6/ 6 Manuel E Banda,17 Jose Maria
Ochoa/ 8 and Francisco Urbalejo19 discussing tactics and strategy.
Whereas the documents provide only isolated glimpses of the military side of the Sonoran campaign, a clearer pattern emerges r~
garding the logistical aspects of that operation. The salient point
is that Villa was in dire financial straits. Even as the campaign
began, his fiat money had become worthless, evidenced by a
rather pathetic telegram from one of his generals stating: "I respectfully inform you that in this region dominated by my forces
people absolutely refuse to accept our paper money. Please tell me
what to do to make them accept it."20
Villa thus found himself in the awkward position of frequently
having to pay for his purchases in dollars, and dollars were scarce
at this stage in his declining career. While he held such border
towns as Nogales and Naco, he could resupply his army from the
United States, but only on a cash basis. For example, among the
expenditures at Naco was one for $6,562.50 for 5,000 sets of
underwear purchased from the Haymon Krupp Company in El
Paso, and an even greater sum for 5,000 unifonns presumably
bought from the same firm. 21 There also arrived at Naco from El
Paso 1A44 sacks of Hour and 200 cases of sardines consigned, interestingly enough, to Sam Dreben, a colorful American soldier
of fortune whose services had already been employed by several
factions in the Mexican Revolution. 22 These transactions, though,
were only faintly reminiscent of the scale on which Villa was once
able to supply his army.
Most of the purchases made at Naco were for insignificant
amounts: $53.90 to S. Felger General Merchandise for sundries;
$395.00 to the Phelps Dodge Mercantile Company for Hour, ~alt,
and forage; $103.50 to one John Towner for hay; and a small
amount of medical supplies from the Meadows Drug Store in
Douglas.23 In addition, there are a number of receipts signed by
Villa's followers for funds disbursed to them by Lieutenant Colonel
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Miguel Trillo, the army's paymaster. The amounts distributed
in Naco total $18,104, plus 12,000 silver pesos. 24 Yet most of these
funds were distributed in driblets, the only significant transactions
being $4,000 to General Manuel Medinabeitia, 4,000 pesos to
General Miguel Saavedra, and $ 10,000 and 8,000 pesos to General
Jose E. Rodriguez, commander of the Naco garrison. But Rodriguez had little opportunity to spend the funds in Naco; he received them on November 7, and on November 15 the town fell
to Obregon's army.
Not only was Obregon's advance depriving Villa of his sources
of supply along the border-Nogales fell on November 26-but
also Villa's sources of funds were dwindling. Most of the money
disbursed at Naco had been extorted from the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, which on November 5 had delivered
at Villa's demand $25,000 as a deposit on export duties. 25 Operations along the border having proved unsuccessful, Villa turned
southward, driving to the outskirts of Hermosillo before giving up
the Sonoran campaign as a fiasco. Among his reasons for abandoning the campaign at the end of November was the fact that his
base in Chihuahua was threatened by contingents of Carranza's
army advancing northward along the central railroad from Torreon.
After a difficult retreat across the Sierra Madre Occidental, during
which he had to abandon his artillery, Villa emerged in western
Chihuahua, endeavoring to regroup what had once been the formidable Division of the North.
His assembly point was the Hacienda de Bustillos, where on
December 23, 1915, he met with his commanders to formulate
strategy.26 They adopted a resolution denouncing Carranza for
allegedly selling out to the United States as the price for diplomatic recognition and reaffirmed their faith in Villa as the leader
who was awakening the nation to the imminent threat from the
United States, which country was described as fomenting discord
among Mexicans in order to have a pretext for intervention. Villa,
as Supreme Chief of Operations of the Conventionist Army, was
rallying his followers to counter this menace, and toward that end
General Severino Ceniceros was commissioned to proceed to the
o
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state of Durango and raise forces to help defend the national
sovereignty.27
Villa continued to expand on this theme. A few days later, hav~
ing transferred his headquarters to the Hacienda de San Ger6nimo,
he designated General Eduardo Ocaranza to deliver a personal
letter to General Emiliano Zapata, the leading revolutionary chieftain in southern Mexico. 28 In this letter Villa made a remarkable
proposal. He began by summarizing the strategy behind his Sonoran campaign, explaining that he had planned to occupy that
state, then sweep southward along the Pacific coast and drive inland through Jalisco and Michoacan in order to link up with
Zapata. The plan, however, had been frustrated because the enemy
had enjoyed the blatant support of the United States government, and Carranza had been able to reinforce his Sonoran garrisons. Villa added that only with great difficulty had he restrained
his infuriated troops from crossing the border to chastize the Americans. To justify having broken off the campaign when he was at
the gates of Hermosillo, Villa stated that he had learned the United
States planned to allow Carranza to move troops on American
railroads to seize Ciudad Juarez, Villa's vital logistical base in
Chihuahua. Yet by the time he managed to return to Chihuahua,
Juarez had been lost to the enemy. Villa lamely explained that
although he still had enough troops to clear Chihuahua of Carranza's forces, he had instead decided to confer with his generals
in order to analyze the situation.
Their analysis was that the United States represented the common foe and that Mexico's independence was about to be lost
unless all honorable Mexicans took up arms to prevent the betrayal of the fatherland. Villa stated that he was sure Zapata was
aware of the agreements into which Carranza had entered with
the United States. Carranza had allegedly agreed to cede Magdalena Bay for ninety-nine years, to grant important concessions regarding railroads and petroleum deposits, and to permit the United
States to approve appointment of Mexican ministers of the T reasury, Interior, and Foreign Relations. In return, Carranza would
receive a loan of $500,000,000, guaranteed by the Mexican public
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revenues, which would be supervised by American appointees. 29
In view of these agreements, Villa thought that Zapata should
realize that the betrayal of the fatherland was a fact. Accordingly,
Villa and his generals had decided to stop fighting their brother
Mexicans and to organize in order to attack the Americans "in
their own lairs," and to impress on them that Mexico was a land of
free men and a tomb for traitors. Villa explained that in order to
inform the public of the situation and to raise as many troops as
possible, he had divided his army into guerrilla bands, to be deployed in various parts of the country for six months, at the end
of which time the Villista forces would concentrate in the state
of Chihuahua to initiate "the movement that will bring about
the union of all Mexicans." Since the proposed invasion of the
United States could only be launched across the border, "in view
of the fact that we have no ships," Villa expressed the hope that
Zapata would agree to come to Chihuahua with all his troops.
Together they could undertake the task of reconstructing Mexico
and chastizing "our eternal enemy which will always be fomenting
hatred and provoking difficulties and disputes among our people."
The letter has a distinct air of unreality about it. Even had he
been willing to collaborate in Villa's grandiose scheme, it was
manifestly impossible for Zapata, who was also in decline militarily, to move his army to Chihuahua across hundreds of miles of
territory firmly controlled by Carranza's forces. Blithely ignoring
this problem, Villa empowered General Ocaranza not only to deliver the letter to Zapata but also to travel elsewhere in the country
to explain the project to other revolutionary chieftains. so Meanwhile, Villa himself continued to make preparations. On February
10, 1916, he sent letters to several of his generals asking how their
recruiting efforts were coming. He added that he intended to meet
with them at Camargo and Jimenez in southern Chihuahua a
month before the proposed campaign in order to work out the
matter of supplying the army, which was to concentrate in Chihuahua. s1 The campaign itself presumably was scheduled to begin
in July 1916.
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Unfortunately, the remaining documents reveal nothing further
about Villa's plans to attack the United States, for they deal with
relatively routine matters. 32 An analysis of the documents confirms
the view of Braddy, who, modifying his earlier position, speculated that "Too much importance can be assigned to these 'lost'
papers, especially the charge that they contained the plan for the
Columbus attack."33 Furthermore, the Villa papers shed little light
on the major theses that have been advanced to explain the motivation for the raid. These theses include: Villa's desire not only to
retaliate against the Americans but also to provoke their intervention in Mexico, thus creating a situation on which he could capitalize;34 his intention to loot Columbus and the nearby 13th Cavalry encampment for munitions, remounts, and provisions;35 his
desire for vengeance against certain Columbus businessmen who
had allegedly defrauded him of money and arms;36 and, finally,
the provocative theory that German agents manipulated Villa into
attacking Columbus in order to embroil the United States in a
war with Mexico.37 If the documents tend to support any thesis, it
would be that of retaliation against the Americans, as indicated
by Villa's speech at Colonia Morelos and his letter to Zapata.
The finding of the Villa manuscripts resolves one of the long- •
standing questions facing historians of the Mexican Revolution.
Whereas the papers provide a sizable body of material for a relatively neglected period of Villa's career, they are also significant for
what they do not contain, namely, his specific motives for attacking
Columbus. Indeed, we may suggest that despite the plethora of
works treating· the Columbus raid, much remains to be done on
this topic. There exist primary sources which no scholar has yet
utilized, such as a brief diary taken from the body of a dead Villista,38 and the 184-page transcript of the trial held in Deming,
New Mexico, for six captured Villistas.89 The definitive history
of the Columbus raid has yet to be written. >I*The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Arts and Sciences
Research Center, New Mexico State University.
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NOTES
I. The 294 documents are found in the National Archives (NA),
Record Group (RG) 94, Adjutant General's Office (AGO), File 2384662
(filed with 2377632). Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent citations
to Villa material refer to documents in this file.
2. Carothers to H. L. Scott, Mar. 13, 1916, Scott Papers, Library of
Congress, as cited in Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises,
1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964), p. 206.
3. U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations of the
United States, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, 66th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Sen. Doc. 285 (Washington, 1920), 1,1781.
4. The letters of transmittal are included with the Villa documents.
5. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca, 1961), p. 244, n. 30.
6. Munch, ''Villa's Columbus Raid: Practical Politics or German
Design?" New Mexico Historical Review, 44 (July 1969), 205, n. 14;
210, n. 60.
7. Sandos, "German Involvement in Northern Mexico, 1915-1916:
A New Look at the Columbus Raid," Hispanic American Historical Review, 50 (Feb. 197°),74, n. 31.
8. Braddy, "Pancho Villa at Columbus: The Raid of 1916," Southwestern Studies, 3 (Spring 1965),4°, n. 40.
9. Colonel Zenaida Torres to Villa, Oct. 20, 1915; Marfa Luisa Velasquez to Villa, Oct. 21,1915.
10. Carlos F. Galan to Villa, Oct. 21, 1915.
11. Signed copy of the speech and the other proceedings, Oct. 26,
1915. This speech seems to contradict Clendenen's interpretation of Villa's
policy toward the Mormon colonists in western Chihuahua. See Clendenen,
The United States and Pancho Villa, p. 208.
12. Randall to Villa, Nov. 14, 1915; Nov. 15, 1915 (two telegrams);
Nov. 16, 1915.
13. Randall to Villa, Nov. 15, 1915 (two telegrams, one marked
"Urgent").
14. Mendez to Villa, Oct. 28, 1915 (two telegrams).
15. Beltran to Villa, Nov. [II?], 1915.
16. Jurado to Villa, Nov. 13, 1915.
17. In a dispatch transmitted by Colonel Jose Marfa Acosta to Villa
at Magdalena, Nov. 15, 1915.
18. Ochoa to Villa, Nov. 14 and 15, 1915.
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19. Urbalejo to Villa, Nov. 14, 1915, and three undated and unsigned
telegrams. See also Villa to Urbalejo, Nov. 15, 1915.
20. Santos Ortiz to Villa, Oct. 20,1915.
21. Bill from Haymon Krupp and Co., Nov. 6, 1915; General Jose E.
RodrIguez to Villa, Nov. 7, 1915. There was no lack of merchants in the
United States willing to do business with Villa, provided the latter could
pay in cash. See, for example, A. Pinegro to Villa, Oct. 2, 1915.
22. Undated bill of lading; receipt signed by Dreben at Naco, Nov. 6,
1915; for sketches of Dreben's career see the El Paso Herald-Post, May
30, 1961, and Oct. 10, 1971.
23. Receipts from S. Felger General Merchandise, Nov. 4, 1915;
receipts from Phelps Dodge Mercantile Co., Nov. 4 and 5, 1915; receipt
from John Towner, Nov. 6, 1915; receipt from Meadows Drug Store, Nov.
3, 1915; see also a telegram from a Dr. Sanchez at Naco to Enrique
Acosta at Douglas, Nov. 4, 1915.
24. Sixty-seven receipts signed at Naco, Nov. 2-7, 1915. There are
similar kinds of receipts as follows: six signed at Juarez on Oct. 9, totaling
$268; twenty-one signed at Casas Grandes on Oct. 12-18, 1915, totaling
$2,355; seven signed at Colonia Morelos on Oct. 23-28, 1915, totaling
$165; one signed at El Realito on Oct. 31,1915, totaling $25; eight signed
at "Campamento" on Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1915, totaling $780; one signed at
Cananea on Nov. 7, totaling $5°0; four signed at Molina on Nov. 10-11,
1915, totaling $275; three signed at Santa Cruz on Nov. 12, 1915, totaling
$370; thirty-four signed at Nogales on Nov. 12-14, 1915, totaling $1,155;
and ten signed at Magdalena on Nov. 14-15, 1915, totaling $127.
25. Receipt issued at Naco on Nov. 5, 1915; the company delivered
$20,200, plus three boxes containing 12,000 silver pesos. It should be
mentioned that there was yet another copy of this receipt, with a marginal
notation that the money was actually paid to ransom three of the company's employees held by Villa. See New York Times, March 11, 1916.
26. List of the twenty-seven generals who conferred with Villa at the
Hacienda de Bustillos, Dec. 23, 1915.
27. Undated and unsigned resolution, evidently taken at Bustillos on
Dec. 23, 1915. General Pablo Bracamonte, who also attended the Bustillos
meeting, was dispatched on a similar mission to Zacatecas. See Carothers
to Secretary of State, April 19, 1916, RG 59, Records of the Department
of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-29 (RDS-M), Microcopy (M) 274, Reel 51,812.00/17922, NA.
28. Villa to Zapata, Jan. 8, 1916. The New York Times published
portions of this letter on Mar. 1 I, 1916. See also Carothers to Secretary
of State, Mar. 10, 1916, RG 59, RDS-M, M274, Reel 51, 812.00/174°1,
NA.
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29. Villa had made the same charges against Carranza in a letter on
Nov. 23, 1915, to General Angel Flores, one of the Carrancistas defending
Hermosillo. See Alberto Calzadiaz Barrera, Hechos Reales de la Revoluci6n, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1967-1972), III, 141-43. Villa evidently believed the
rumors that Carranza had secretly accepted these conditions, despite a
public denial by Carranza's special agent in Washington. See New York
Times, Oct. 24, 1915.
30. Villa to Whom It May Concern, Jan. 8, 1916.
31. [Villa] to General Benjamin Argumedo, Feb. 10, 1916; same to
General Ceniceros, Feb. 10, 1916; same to General Canuto Reyes [Feb.
10, 1916?]. Similar letters were apparently sent to Generals Calixto Contreras and Santos Banuelos.
32. These papers i~clude a letter from Villa at the Hacienda de Busti110s on Dec. 24, 1915, authorizing General Beltran to take possession of
the Hacienda de Sainapuchi; a letter from Colonel Pablo LOpez at the
Hacienda de Rubio on Jan. 6, 1916, inviting Beltran for a conference; a
letter from General Julio Acosta at Ciudad Guerrero on Jan. 12, 1916, asking Villa to transfer Colonel L6pez and his troops because of the abuses
they were committing in that town; a letter from Villa to Colonel Julian
Cardenas on Feb. 15, 19 I 6, authorizing the latter to assemble the home
guards of the Haciendas de Rubio and La Quemada; and a copy of the
Order of the Day issued by Villa's headquarters at the Hacienda de San
Ger6nimo on Feb. 18, 1916.
33. Braddy, Pershing's Mission in Mexico (£1 Paso, 1966), p. 70, n. 8.
34- Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram (New York,
1958), p. 93; Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, p. 245;
Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, p. 207.
35. Braddy, "Pancho Villa at Columbus," p. 36; Munch, "Villa's
Columbus Raid," p. 198.
36. Alberto Calzadiaz Berrera, Por Que Villa Atac6 Columbus (Intriga
Internacional) (Mexico, 1972); Clendenen, The United States and Pancho
Villa, pp. 245-46.
.
37. Sandos, "German Involvement in Northern Mexico," passim;
Munch, "Villa's Columbus Raid," pp. 200-4. Also see Friedrich Katz,
"Alemania y Francisco Villa," Historia Mexicana, 12 (July-Sept. 1962),
88-102.
38. Zach L. Cobb to Secretary of State, March II, 1916, RG 59,
RDS-M, M274, Reel 51, 812.00!i7427, NA.
39; State of New Mexico vs. Eusevio Renteria et aI., Luna District
Court Case #664, 1916, State Records Center, Santa Fe, New Mexico.

